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distinction between imperfect self 
defense and the heat of passion defenses 
is that the defendant acted the way he 
did due to a "fear of life" rather than a 
heat of passion. The judicial recognition 
of the imperfect self defense allows the 
courts to avoid the choice between 
murder and complete exonerations in 
non-heat of passion cases where the 
defendant's conduct warranted neither a 
murder conviction nor an acquittal. 
This defense requires the defendant to 
bear some responsibility for the 
homicide, even though he may have 
lacked the requisite mens rea for 
murder. 
The court reviewed the history of the 
imperfect self defense doctrine and 
found that the case law revealed three 
variations of the doctrine. Some courts 
have applied the doctrine where the 
homicide at issue falls within the perfect 
self defense doctrine, except for the fault 
of the defendant in provoking or 
initiating the difficulty at the non-deadly 
force level. Other courts have applied 
the doctrine where the defendant 
committed a homicide because of an 
honest but unreasonable belief that he 
was about to suffer death or serious 
bodily harm. Still, other courts have 
recognized the doctrine when the 
defendant uses unreasonable force in 
defending himself and as a result, killed 
his opponent. 
Prior to the Faulkner decision, the 
court of special appeals had dealt with 
six imperfect defense cases which 
gradually expanded the application of 
this mitigating defense to the criminal 
defenses of imperfect defense of others, 
Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 349 
A2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 
733 (1976) imperfect defense of duress, 
Wentworth v. State, 29 Md. App. 110, 
349 A.2d 421 (1975), cert. denied, 278 
Md. 735 (1976), and imperfect defense 
of habitation, Law v. State, 29 Md. App. 
457,349 A2d 295 (1975), cert. denied, 
278 Md. 729 (1976). 
Due to the Faulkner decision, the 
defendant is now presented with a wide 
range of mitigating defenses that serve to 
reduce a conviction of murder to 
manslaughter. As the Court stated, "A 
defendant who commits a homicide 
while honestly, though unreasonably, 
believing that he is threatened with 
death or serious bodily harm, does not 
act with malice. Absent malice, he 
cannot be convicted of murder. 
Nevertheless, because the killing was 
committed without justification or 
excuse, the defendant is not entitled to 
full exoreration. " Yet, according to the 
court the defendant is entitled to a 
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proper instruction to show the 
defendant's subjective (honest) belief 
that the use of force was necessary to 
prevent imminent death or serious 
bodily harm. Once the defendant has 
established the existence of that belief, 
the jury must reject the reasonableness 
of that belief as well as the existence of 
that belief itself to find the defendant 
guilty of murder. m 
by Regan J .R. Smith 
DWI Rights 
Chemical Sobriety Test 
by Jennifer Hammond 
T he Maryland Court of Appeals recently considered the issue of whether a person who is appre-
hended for driving while intoxicated has 
a constitutional right to consult counsel 
before deciding whether to submit to a 
chemical sobriety test. In Sites v. State, 
300 Md. 701,481 A2d 192 (1984), the 
court of appeals held that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, as well as Article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, 
requires that a person under detention 
as a drunk driving suspect must, if the 
suspect so requests, be permitted a 
reasonable opportunity to communicate 
with counsel before submitting to a 
chemical sobriety test, as long as the 
attempted communication will not 
substantially interfere with the timely 
administration of the testing process. 
The laws concerning submission to a 
sobriety test in Maryland are fairly clear-
cut. For instance, a chemical sobriety 
test must be administered within two 
hours "after the person accused is 
apprehended." Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
Code Ann. § 10-303 (1984). A person 
may not be compelled to submit to such 
a test and any refusal is not admissible at 
a trial since no inference or presumption 
concerning guilt arises as a result of 
refusal to submit to the test. Md. Cts. & 
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-309 (1984). 
Additionally, § 16-205.l(a) of the 
Transportation Article - the "implied 
consent" statute - explicitly states that 
any person who operates a motor 
vehicle in Maryland is deemed to have 
consented to take a chemical test to 
determine alcohol content if that person 
is apprehended on suspicion of drunk 
driving. Md. Transp. Code Ann. §16-
205.l(b) (1984). 
Maryland driver who declines to take 
the chemical sobriety test "shall" have 
his license suspended for not less than 
60 days or more than 6 months for a first 
offense. Md. Transp. Code Ann. §16-
205.l(b) (1984). 
As previously stated, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals in Sites based its 
decision on the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The court, 
citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 
(1952), stated that, while the exact 
contours of the due process clause are 
not definable with precision, the 
constitutional right of due process 
assures that convICtions cannot be 
brought about in criminal cases by 
methods which offend a sense of justice. 
According to the Sites court, Maryland's 
implied consent statute, by allowing a 
suspect to refuse chemical testing, 
deliberately gives the licensed driver a 
choice between two different potential 
sanctions each of which affect vitally 
important interests. That is, a driver 
may submit to the test and any adverse 
results may be used against that driver in 
a criminal trial for drunk driving. On the 
other hand, if the driver refuses to 
submit to the chemcial sobriety test then 
that individual's drivers license "shall" 
be suspended for not less than 60 days 
nor more than 6 months for first 
offense. Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 16-
20S.1(b) (1984). In addition, the court 
noted that "revocation of a driver's 
license may burden the ordinary driver 
as much or more than the traditional 
criminal sanctions of fine or 
imprisonment." 300 Md. at 717, 481 
A.2d at 199-200. Moreover, the 
continued possession of a driver's 
license may become essential to earning 
a livelihood and therefore may be an 
entitlement which cannot be taken 
without the due process mandated by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on 
the foregoing, the court ruled that "to 
unreasonably deny a requested right of 
access to counsel to a drunk driving 
suspect offends a sense of justice which 
impairs the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding." 300 Md. at 717,481 A.2d 
at 200. 
Therefore, the court in Sites held that 
if a person under detention for drunk 
driving requests to telephone an 
attorney for advice on whether to take a 
sobriety test the police must honor that 
request. The holding of the court is not 
without limits, however. That is, the 
court held that "a person under 
detention for drunk driving must, on 
request, be permitted a reasonable 
opportunity to communicate with 
counsel before submitting to a chemical 
sobriety test, as long as such attempted 
communication will not substantially 
interfere with the timely and efficacious 
administration of the testing process." 300 
Md. at 717-18, 481 A.2d at 200. 
(emphasis added). The court noted that 
there is no "bright line" rule as to what 
constitutes a reasonable delay (although 
Md. Cts. &Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-
303 (1984) mandates that in no event 
may the test be administered later than 
two hours after the driver's 
apprehension). According to the court, 
the statutory purpose of the drunk 
driving laws is to obtain the best 
evidence of blood alcohol content as 
may be practicable under the 
circumstances, and it is common 
knowledge that such blood alcohol 
content dissipates with the passage of 
time. Thus, the court held that if counsel 
cannot be contacted within a reasonable 
time, an individual may be required to 
make a decision regarding testing 
without the advice of counsel. The Sites 
court further emphasized that under no 
circumstances may the right to 
communicate with counsel be permitted 
to delay the test for an unreasonable 
time since such a delay would impair the 
accuracy of the test and defeat the 
purpose of the statute. 
The court concluded that the 
determination as to whether a drunk 
driving suspect who seeks to 
communicate with counsel has been 
denied his due process right to do so 
depends on the circumstances of each 
case. If a suspect submits to a chemical 
sobriety test after being denied his due 
process right to contact an attorney, 
then, according to the Sites court, the 
only effective sanction is to suppress the 
results of the test where such results ar~ 
adverse to the defendant. Nonetheless, 
the court warned that a reviewing court 
should afford great deference to the 
determination of the police authorities 
that it was reasonably necessary for the 
timely administration of the chemical 
sobriety test to deny the requested right 
of access to counsel. 
SAFECO CONTINUES TO SERVE YOU 
We are a full service title organization 
working with attorneys. lending institu-
tions. real estate firms and individuals. 
Our expert team of title personnel and 
our efficient and experienced agents are 
always available for all your title 
requirements. 
"Experience and tenure are important" 
@j SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF MARYLAND 
110 ST PAUL STREET 
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202 (301) 727-3700 
SjJrll1g, 1985 'The La\\' FOIllIll-11 
